



The rapid growth of technology, with the resultant strains in the struc-
ture of modern society, has added an entirely new dimension to the inter-
related problems of internal security and international stability and law.1
The destructiveness and exhaustion of two World Wars, followed by the
development of modern nuclear weapons, have complicated the problem of
defense to an incredible degree, with the result that the role of nuclear
weapons is limited essentially to deterrence of major attack. Concurrently,
although modern technology has raised greatly the conventional firepower
and mobility counterforce characteristics of the more nearly traditional
weapons systems, it is certainly not apparent that this has increased deci-
sively the political-consolidation potential of these weapons, when they are
employed locally in revolutionary warfare. At the same time, it can hardly
be questioned that improving communications and increasing potential for
travel and commerce are contributing at an ever-increasing rate to revolu-
tionary expectations, and that demands among the underprivileged in both
the developed and the under-developed areas of the world are contributing
to instabilities in traditional political structures and alignments.
Perhaps the clearest manifestation of what could become a trend toward
political fragmentation is the proliferation of small, independent states in a
bi-polar world in which great gradations in the independent power of
sovereign states had already become evident in the period immediately
following World War 11. One counter to political fragmentation is, of
course, international organization; membership in international organiza-
tions has grown in number from fewer than fifty states in the early days of
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the League to some 126 presently in the UN. It is far from clear, however,
that international organization is in itself a substitute for force to uphold
the law, and support and defend government in a war or revolutionary
crisis.
In the twenty years since the end of World War 1I, from 1945 to 1965,
there have been some forty wars, ranging from the Communist take-over in
China to the present military operation in South Vietnam. When a crisis
occurs, the requirement, simply put, is to preserve authority, provide
security and minimize violence. Within the framework of such a require-
ment, which basically is a restatement of the traditional problem of order,
are the obvious questions concerning the locus, structure and domain of
political authority, and the role of law and force in this equation.
In their broadest aspects, the notions of law, security and force are
essentially inseparable. Under law, the unique individual is presumed to be
secure in his rights and values, and this security of course encompasses the
future as well as the present. Beyond that, in a very real sense it also
encompasses the past, since the notion of the unique individual at any
given stage in the historical processes presupposes some antecedents.
Presumably some degree of regularity in the succession of events, and
thus security, has existed over the ages for the individual to have come into
being, whatever his stage of development, or lack of it, at any given time.
Individual being and development are necessarily-at least to some de-
gree-reflective of an on-going social process, since the individual is nur-
tured in the group. As a personality, the individual is hardly conceivable
except as a member of society, and society itself is in its own essence a
manifold of individual-group relationships.
For the individual, security has to do with his status and role in society,
with both the formal and informal processes through which members of the
society preserve and realize values in an orderly way. In this process, the
rights of one individual represent patterns of influence over the conduct of
others. Security for the individual in his rights presumes them to be en-
forceable, both as to his person as well as to his privileges and pre-
rogatives. Further, the aggregation of enforceable individual rights suggests
that there is compulsion to conform, moral as well as physical, in the
momentum of the on-going social process.
In any case, the idea of compulsion, or indeed of force itself, pre-
supposes some pattern of uniformity or order through which energy and
activity are channelled. 2 This is in contrast to the idea of violence, which
2Cf. "Force is only effective for dealing with disobedience when disobedience is ex-
ceptional and obedience is normal; it is the result, not the cause, of obedience being normal."
BRIERLY, supra, note 1, 44.
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marks the breakdown or absence of order-the unconditioned or unstruc-
tured effect of energy or activity. Overall, the rights of individuals are
interrelated in the activities that characterize the group. Security for all
rests upon order, stability and adaptability in society-in the common
good, with justice for all.
In so far as it concerns human conduct, the notion of law carries both an
expectation and a demand. This is reflected most clearly in the wide range
of mental constructs having to do with the idea of natural law. Interpreted
as it has been, variously as the rule of reason, as customary law, as an
aspect of the divine order, even as a mechanistic interpretation of the
physical universe, natural law has endured as the conceptual underpinning
of the idea of law itself. Mac Iver puts it this way: 3
"Every society, at every stage of civilization, rests on a firmament of law
that is vastly greater and much more intricate than any ever devised by
Government, one that is too great and too intricate to be completely over-
turned even by the most revolutionary of Governments. We must recognize
this elementary fact if we are to understand the nature of Government and the
authority of Government."
What is important is that we recognize that, for society generally, law is
essentially normative, with ethical and moral overtones well beyond its
rationalized statement as positive law. Allowing, as John Austin did, that
law in its positive form is simply a command-a command of the sover-
eign -we are still faced with the moral basis of authority and the notion of
the political myth.4 Certainly, with reference to the modern state, it would
be difficult to challenge P. E. Corbett's description of law as a complex of
rules, procedures and agencies, supported and enforced by politically orga-
nized societies.5 But today, as noted earlier, the more significant questions
arise in efforts to evaluate the impact of recent developments, both political
and technological, upon the basis of political authority itself-upon its
locus, its structure, and its extent and scope.
As a positive expression of political authority, modern law provides for
essential administrative and regulative functions, for punitive actions, for
the redress of wrongs, and for the common defense. To the degree that law
is accepted as authoritative, it acts as a guarantee of rights, and provides
3R. M. MAC IVER, THE WEB OF GOVERNMENT (New York: MacMillan Co., 1947), 65.4Cf. "Government is the organization of men under authority, and their ever changing
myths are themselves sovereign alike as the governors and the governed." MAC IVER, supra
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5P. E. CORBETT, LAW AND SOCIETY IN THE RELATIONS OF STATES (New York: Har-
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the basis of security for both the group and the individual. Historically,
however, at various stages in civilization and under varying circumstances,
the enforcement of rights and the relief from wrongs have been obtained
through either private or public acts of force, or a combination of the two.
Grotius himself dealt with the law of peace as a matter of rights which
might justly be vindicated by war-public, private or mixed. 6 The dis-
tinguishing characteristic of the modern state, however, has been the con-
solidation of authority, with exclusive control over the use of force resting
in the state.
With monopoly over the use of force residing in the sovereign state,
enforcement of domestic law became exclusively a public function. Within
the international order, however, the sovereign state remained dependent
upon its own actions to enforce rights and redress wrongs through political
and diplomatic action, supported by war as necessary. In this sense the
enforcement of law, from the perspective of the state, remained essentially
private.
More recently, efforts to eliminate war through international agreement
and organization have emphasized the provision of peaceful means for
maintaining international security, and obtaining relief for injury received.
Additionally, the widening concept of governmental responsibility for pub-
lic service has added greatly to the emphasis upon international adminis-
trative services and organizations. On the face of it, however, the authority
and power to enforce both rights and obligations continues to appear as an
essential and distinguishing characteristic of the sovereign state.
II
For well over three hundred years, the notion of sovereignty has been at
the core of activities designed to achieve security-both internal and ex-
ternal. From the end of the Thirty Years War until the end of World War 1,
both domestic and international law developed as a positive expression of
the authority of the nation state. In effect, the notion of sovereignty
provided the conceptual link between the expression of political authority
and its concrete realization in the power of the state. One can say with
considerable justification that Bodin's 16th century concept of sovereignty,
as the supreme power over citizens and subjects unrestrained by laws, was
realized in its essential form in the 19th century positivist doctrine of law.7
6 HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE, Bk 1, Ch III; CORBETT. Op. cit., at
211. 7JEAN BODIN. Six BOOKS CONCERNING THE STATE, Bk I, Chs VIII and X.
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Bodin, of course, favored royal sovereignty since it contributed to do-
mestic solidarity through reducing the power of the nobility, relative to that
held by the king. In this, his emphasis differed from that of Machiavelli,
who focused upon the expansion and manipulation of sovereign power by
hundreds of independent princes, whatever their station. 8 Bodin's works
show clearly that he viewed the sovereign power of the King as structured
internally, in a hierarchy of the nobility superimposed on the orders of the
people of humble mien, although not limited by them. He recognized it as
the proper function of the sovereign to protect the citizen from injury by
enemies and by other citizens, and he distinguished sharply between the
treatment accorded under civil law to those seeking to overthrow com-
monwealths and subvert civil order.
Hobbes, in contrast to Bodin, saw sovereign authority as the product of
a compact of individual men. 9 Hobbes viewed domestic insecurity as a
condition of war, with every man against every man, and he justified
absolute sovereign authority solely on the ground that it was the basis for a
condition of peace. In his formulation, Hobbes is very careful not to deny
to any man the use of force to defend himself when under unconditioned
attacks. However, no right to resist authority is retained to the individual.
The sovereign alone is responsible for keeping the peace. Hobbes too,
emphasized the exclusive right, and the obligation, of the sovereign power
to make war and peace with other nations in the public good, recognizing
as he did that war and peace are states or conditions over time, and not
acts in themselves.
It was at this time that Grotius published his great work. De jure belli ac
pacis, laying the foundation for the subsequent development of Western
concepts of international law. 10 Grotius wrote at a time when the Scholas-
tics had developed a highly refined concept of just war. Under this concept,
control of warfare was essentially moral, within the framework of a
world-wide community of man, ordered by human, natural and divine law.
This was also a time when Europe itself was in a state of upheaval, in the
transition from Church and Empire as the basis of order to the nation-state
system.
Grotius himself, accepting as he did a form of natural law, viewed war as
a state of affairs or condition in which politically equal entities are con-
8 MACHIAVEI.LI, THE PRINCE, Ch XV.C: QUINCY WRIGHT, A STUDY OF WAR (2 Vols.;
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942), II, 899-906.
9THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, Part II, Ch XVII.
10Cf DAVID J. HILL, The Works and Influence of Hugo Grotius, Introduction to Hugo
Grotius, THE RIGHTS OF PEACE AND WAR, trans. A. C. Campbell (Washington, D.C.: M.W.
Dunne, 1901), 3; JULIUS STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT (New
York: Rinehart Co., 1959), 10, et. passim.
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tending with armed force. He, along with Bodin, saw political power
structured as a hierarchy with sovereignty at a denominated level; but in
contrast to Bodin, he focused upon relationships among sovereigns rather
than upon internal relationships. He valued sovereignty because it pro-
vided a basis for international order through centralized responsibility for
peace and the humanization of war throughout the international commu-
nity. Although he acknowledges private war as a fact, Grotius in effect
reserves to the sovereign power the right to make public war. In this he
follows the lead of those scholastic writers who, recognizing the distinction
between public and private war, reserved to the sovereign power the right
to make public war.
Medieval writers generally had distinguished between the right to wage
war and the actual fighting; they presumed the right to wage war as a
condition precedent to justification of the actual conduct of warfare. In the
view of these writers, this right to wage war as a function of political
authority was not the only criterion for just war. It was only one of several
conditions which had to be met. Grotius himself justified war only on the
grounds of "defense, indemnity, and punishment," and, laying the founda-
tion for later efforts at collective security, he sought to induce neutral
states not to aid an aggressor nor to hinder a state whose cause was just.
Concurrent with the growth of modern concepts relating to the meaning
and locus of sovereignty, was the process of consolidation of principalities
and other minor political sub-divisions into national states throughout Eu-
rope. Force of arms was of itself an important factor in this process. On the
one hand, increasing wealth and rationalization of administration made
possible the building of disciplined armies, indepdendent of subordinate
loyalties and capable of sustained operations in the field; on the other, cost
and size of these armies limited the capabilities of subordinate princes to
raise and maintain such armies.
The growth of technology also had a very significant direct effect; the
introduction of both the longbow and the crossbow, followed shortly by
gun-powder and artillery, marked the end, in the field, of the dominance of
the heavily armored knight, and in sieges, of the very significant defensive
capability of the feudal castle.1 As a result, by the end of the Thirty Years
War, the group of what could qualify as sovereign nations had been re-
duced in Europe to a very moderate number.
In this process, it became apparent that the locus of command of the
armed forces was critical to the locus of sovereignty. Control over the
llCf. WENDELL J. COATS, ARMED FORCE As POWER: THE THEORY OF WAR RECONSI-
DERED (New York: Exposition Press, 1966), 80-84.
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armed forces became an essential element in the assumption of political
authority over territory and peoples. As a result, in the evolving concepts
of sovereignty, the question of war as a right was isolated from the ques-
tion of what conditions justify resort to war. Although the two at times
have appeared essentially inseparable, they are not the same and the
distinction is important. 12
The question of war as a right acts to consolidate domestic control by
restricting to the sovereign the exclusive right, and thus ultimately the
capability, to employ force. The question of what conditions justify resort
to war points to minimizing violence through delineating the conditions that
justify the use of force. The separation of these two questions was the
forerunner of the doctrine of consent and established a basis for separating
the legality of war from the question of whether it was just. The legality of
war thus remained bound to the possibilities for the actual limitation of the
methods and means employed in warfare, through control over the forces
involved.
Writing in the 18th century, Vattel recognized that war could not be just
on both sides.' 3 He broadened the concept of just war, incorporating
defense and the preservation of rights into a right to security. In this
transformation, Vattel in effect shifted the focus from war as a condition or
state of affairs in which certain activities are authorized, to war as an act of
the state - to war as a contention with force.
In keeping with this view of war in the material sense, positive-law
doctrine interpreted both belligerents as acting lawfully, for all external
purposes. To have interpreted it otherwise would have been an in-
fringement upon the equality and independence of a state. Neutrality was
abstention by all governments from all assistance affecting the conduct of
the war. As it actually evolved, however, the concept of neutrality was
eventually the product of an accumulation of bilateral treaties, with states
agreeing not to aid each others' enemies. Eventually, the concept came to
include the avoidance of the spread of war and of preserving to neutrals, to
the degree possible, the rights in neutral trade and territory which they are
capable of exercising in peace.
With the emphasis upon the right of war as characteristic of sovereignty,
the central problem of security became one of maintaining the international
order through the balancing of power in Europe. Each sovereign state was
12 1d., at 298, et passim.
13 E. DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW, trans.
of the edition of 1758, C.G. Fenwick (Washington: Carnegie Institute of Washington, 1916),
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presumed to act in its own national interest. Within the limits of rights
guaranteed by the balancing of the system, states were equal and supreme.
Internal order was a national problem to the extent that it did not threaten
the overall balance. Each state was obligated to refrain from interference in
the internal affairs of others, to keep agreements, to refrain from territorial
conquest, and to settle disputes peacefully-through negotiation, mediation
or arbitration, if possible.
The First World War confirmed, however, what had already begun to be
evident, that with expanding technology, the level of violence could not be
contained and the international order maintained, when the vital interests
of major blocs of nations were at issue. The Versailles Treaty, which was
essentially punitive, marked the end of efforts to maintain the balance of
power in Europe. In any case, this would have been impossible with the
growth of major concentrations of industrial power away from Western
Europe. The emphasis is now shifted back toward the concept of just war.
The goal became one of preventing the resort to war, with war itself as an
instrument for punishing the aggressor. The Allied policy, in the Second
World War, of unconditional surrender was essentially a reflection of this
view.
Collective sanctions against aggressor states was the theoretical basis for
international stability under the League of Nations. This principle was
further extended by the Kellogg-Briand Pact in which sixty-three nations
renounced war as an "instrument of national policy." The Pact did, how-
ever, preserve to each state the "inherent right of self-defense," and it left
open a legitimate question as to whether a state might resort to force "short
of war" to enforce rights. This ambiguity was partially eliminated in the
United Nations Charter, which prohibits the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity, or political independence of any state.
With the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the United Nations Charter, war in
the formal sense as a means for settling disputes between independent
sovereign states has been eliminated. At least in principle, there is agree-
ment on the requirement, in the event of hostilities, to take effective
collective measures for the suppression of acts of aggression. Additionally,
at Nuremberg following the end of World War I1, political leaders were
tried, condemned and executed for their role in behalf of their states in
committing "aggressor war" and "crimes against humanities." This marked
a further departure from positive-law doctrine, which had supported the
view that states, and not individuals as such, were legal persons under
international law. The United Nations Charter, in the matter of human
rights, seems to portend a further step toward practices in international law
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favoring some recognition of individuals as members of an international
society.
From an historical point of view, the importance of any restriction upon
the sovereign right to make war can hardly be in doubt. Holding members
of a government responsible for aggressor war and protecting human rights
within the states, has profound significance for the political exercise of
sovereign powers, whatever their legal form. Independently of any consid-
eration of benefits resulting from limitations upon international war, such
action necessarily raises critical questions as to the nature of the sociolo-
gical mechanism that will function as a substitute for the sovereign right to
make war, in creating internal discipline reinforced by fear of the external
enemy.
Ill
Focus on the notion of war in the material sense (warfare) shifts the
emphasis in control of violence in international law to the laws of war. The
central issue becomes one of regulating the act of fighting itself, upon
regulation of the techniques for creating and using the instruments of
violence. This view is in marked contrast to the view of war as a legal state
or condition, wherein fighting may be expected to occur. In the latter case,
the emphasis is upon the perspectives of the conflict in which armed force
is employed as a means. The difference between these two concepts is
highlighted in the legal distinction between the end of war and the imme-
diate purpose or objective of war, which is defeat of the enemy's armed
forces. As a logical proposition, the two can, of course, be integrated
hypothetically under the concept of conflict as a process of unifying author-
ity in the area of combat operations.
Implicit in the laws of war regulating the use of armed force, is the
interaction of three basic principles. The first of these is that a belligerent is
justified in using the degree and kind of force necessary to the realization of
the purpose of war, namely, the overthrow of the enemy. This principle is
complex and has many facets. It is a recognition of the basic military
requirement to defeat the enemy armed forces.
The second is a basic principle of humanity which seeks to reduce
useless or senseless suffering. It postulates that degrees and kinds of
violence not necessary to the defeat of the enemy are not permitted. The
third principle is one calling for a certain fairness and good faith in dealing
with the opponent. It recognizes the existence of a relationship between
the belligerents beyond the act of fighting itself, and contributes to some
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basis for fair dealing with the enemy after the fighting is over. Basically,
these principles presuppose war as a violent contention between states
through their armed forces. In this equation, the role of the armed forces
themselves becomes the central element in the control of violence.
Inherent in the interaction of the principles outlined are two what may
become countervailing pressures-the one to raise the level of effective
force in accordance with the requirements of military necessity, the other
to conform to the principles of humanity and preserve good faith.14
Earlier concepts of just war all had incorporated in them some notion of
an equitable relationship between the level of violence and an injury re-
ceived, or a right violated. 15 In this view, injury or the prevention of injury,
formed the only justifiable cause of war. On the other hand, it is inconceiv-
able that the use of force to resist an attack would not aggregate the earlier
injury, at least to some degree.
On the whole, it seems apparent that the concept of just war had in it,
from a military standpoint, three critical pre-suppositions: the first was that
the defender could sustain an initial injury and react; the second was that it
would be possible for either opponent to regulate the degree of violence
resulting from the force he was obliged to employ in the course of combat,
and still maintain his capability to react; and the third was that the act of
force would either create, or at least would not destroy, the basis of order.
In the context of the combat action itself, decisive military operations offer,
of course, a possibility for limiting violence in warfare through quick defeat
of the enemy armed forces.
In the actual conduct of military operations, limitation of violence
through law depends first, upon regulating the use of force through com-
mand and control of the armed forces, and second, upon being able to
differentiate between lawful and unlawful actions. Directly related to this
question are limiting considerations having to do with belligerency and
non-belligerency, with combatants and noncombatants, and with neutrality
and the region of war.
Legal limitations have related, historically, generally to the means and
modes of violence, and permissible weapons and objects of attack. An
14 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE, ed. H. Lauterpacht, (2 Vols.;
New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1955), 208-209. Cf "The bounds between the legiti-
mate pursuit of victory, and the infliction of suffering unnecessary to victory, may in words
seem clear and settled. Concretely, however, they have been revolutionised in the last half
century." Stone, op. cit., supra note 10, at 338.
'
5MORTON A. KAPLAN AND NICHOLAS DEB KATZENBACH, THE POLITICAL FOUNDA-
TION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (New York: John Wiley & Son, 1961), 201; ALFRED VAN-
DERPOL, LA DOCTRINE SCHOLASTIQUE DU DROIT DE GUERRE (Paris: A. Pedone, 1919),
52-56.
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analysis of the laws of war which bear directly upon the conduct to be
observed in warfare, would seem to reflect ultimately a presumption that
the decisive element in combat will be the combat action of the organized
armed forces. If the combat action of these forces can be decisive in ending
the war without involving the population in the hostilities, the basic pur-
pose of the laws of war will have been served.
Some presumption about the indivisibility of the state and its armed
force is readily apparent. It is only in this link that the goal of military
victory takes on credibility as a means to end the war. Although the chief
means by which a belligerent seeks victory is through an attack against
enemy persons, this right is not an unlimited or indiscriminate one, as the
traditional distinction between combatant and noncombatant confirms. In
addition to attack upon enemy persons, attack upon the enemy's materiel
and his economic basis of warfare is, of course, allowed. However, it is the
attack upon enemy persons which has always been presumed to be deci-
sive; that is, the attack upon the enemy's armed forces is presumed to
achieve the ultimate purpose of the war-overpowering the enemy state.
The basic presumptions in the laws of war seem to have found their
support in concepts arising during the period of relatively limited land war
in 17th and 18th century Europe. Economic and industrial development
supported the growth of national conscript armies to the degree they did
not interfere with economic growth. Increased effectiveness of firepower
tended to balance off losses of the victor with those of the defeated, as the
Battle of Malplaquet (1709) vividly demonstrated. Finally, the balance of
power in Europe remained relatively stable with England, from her insular
position, playing the role of counterweight. However, the Napoleonic wars,
although not upsetting the power balance ultimately, raised some very
significant problems in the operation of the system.
Clausewitz, in what was essentially a codification of his interpretation of
the Napoleonic concept of warfare, dealt with war as "an act of force to
compel our adversary to do our will." 16 He did not, however, as some of
his later interpreters insisted, confuse the military aims of war, "disarming
the enemy," with the political object of war, "to impose our will upon the
enemy." Clausewitz recognized the logical fault in the separation of the
military aim from the political object, but he saw the two rejoined in the
unity of policy with war as mere continuation of political intercourse, with
an admixture of other means. Nevertheless, it is clear that he distinguished
16KARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR, trans. 0. J. Matthijs Jolles (New York: The
Modern Library, 1943), 3. For a further analysis of this point, see COAT ES, op. cit., supra note
I , at 27-37.
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carefully among the enemy's military force, his country or land area, and
his national will. His basic thesis was quick military victory and occupation
of enemy country, so the enemy and his allies could be induced to make
peace.
From the standpoint of force alone, Napoleon's experience in the Penin-
sular War and in Russia demonstrated the potential for continuing and
unlimited violence, when the enemy's armed force could not be brought to
battle and defeated decisively. Prussia's experience in France in the
Franco-Prussian War, demonstrated further the potential for violence even
after the enemy armies had been defeated, the head of state a prisoner, and
the country largely occupied.
The rules of the laws of war developed separately for land and sea
warfare. The effect of air warfare has been to alter the perspective of war
itself, although generally the attempt has been to interpret the law in
specific situations according to the general principles of customary or
conventional character which underlie the rules of land and sea warfare.
Subject to well-defined limitations, long-range firepower and bombing have
nevertheless had the effect of making the laws of warfare converge in the
changing body of rules relating to bombardment, siege and assault, all of
which have been recognized means of warfare.
In the rules of land warfare, two aims are readily identified-defeat of
enemy armed forces on land, and occupation and administration of enemy
territory. In the rules of sea warfare, several aims can be enumer-
ated-defeat of the enemy navy, destruction of enemy shipping and coastal
fortifications, blockade, support for land operations and defense of the
home coast and merchant fleet, all of which can be related to the defeat of
the enemy navy.
Comparable aims for air warfare can be deduced from the legitimacy of
aerial combat and bombing directed against military targets, since the
nature of air power is such that defeat of enemy air forces cannot be dealt
with independently of the attack on ground targets. In any case, however,
an essential difference is to be observed between land warfare, in which
administrative control over enemy territory is established through military
occupation following invasion; and sea and air warfare, in which adminis-
trative control over enemy territory is necessarily presumed to remain with
the enemy state.
To the extent that war remains a contention between states through their
armed forces, the purpose of war can be served by the acceptance by the
state whose forces have been defeated of such conditions of peace as the
victor pleases. Until that point is reached, under the rules of land warfare,
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military requirements presumably establish the levels and kinds of violence
necessary to defeat the enemy armed forces and to occupy his country in
order to bring an end to hostilities and establish order and security.
Experience in two World Wars has now demonstrated, however, that, in
the absence of political concessions by one or both of the belligerents, the
search for decisive victory may simply turn the war into one of attrition
and diffused violence. Modern technology has provided the capability for
supporting and sustaining combat over large areas of the Earth's surface
for extended periods of time. At the same time, strategic bombing and long
range sea blockade provided the means for expanding the area of violence,
independent of the sweep of ground operations and the occupation of
enemy territory.
Additionally, Japanese experience in China, German experience in occu-
pied territories, and, more recently, post-war experience in Asia and Africa
demonstrate that military occupation by one belligerent is not, in itself, an
answer to the problem of order and security in the face of determined and
organized insurgency or revolutionary warfare. Overall, the failure of the
laws of warfare in limiting violence seems not to be simply in the pressure
of military necessity, but in the breakdown of order and political organiza-
tion, and the resultant decline of humanitarian values and good faith gener-
ally.
The laws of warfare rest upon belief in the possibilities for distinguishing
between combatant and noncombatant, between belligerent and
non-belligerent. The basis for this distinction has been the belief that the
central issues in warfare could be decided in organized warfare. The
effectiveness of these laws rests in large measure upon the principle of
reciprocity between belligerents. To the degree that civil order itself be-
comes the issue in control of a country and its population, the problem
necessarily becomes one of political authority and organization of the
entire population, and not simply occupation by military forces. The ration-
ale in this situation shifts to one of internal consolidation of political
authority, rather than defeat of an enemy.
IV
The notion of peace, like the notion of war, is complex. In a simplified
way, it expresses a deep-seated human yearning for idyllic tranquillity in
justice. But in a broader sense, it reflects a concept of public order and
security-a structured integration of complex, interrelated activities, to-
gether with a system of norms acting to regulate them. Furthermore, in a
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very real sense, neither peace nor war can be comprehended fully, indepen-
dently of each other. In effect, both peace and war may be viewed as states
or conditions over time, within which concrete actions are taking place. As
such, each is an aspect of a political process which transcends them both.
The concepts of peace and war both include law and violence; and some
use of force has been found necessary in all groups to suppress the
evil-doer and maintain justice. It is only when there is forceful opposition,
sufficient to raise the level of violence to the point that order and justice are
in doubt, that the peace has been broken. As Quincy Wright has pointed
out, peace can be described as the condition of a community in which order
and justice prevail, internally among its members and externally in its
relations with other communities. Similarly, war can be described as the
legal condition in which two or more hostile groups carry on a conflict by
armed force. 1 7
The historical relativity of peace and war to each other as legal concepts
is demonstrable. 18 But what it means in concrete reality is that to say that
states are at war or at peace is not always clear. Certainly, the normative
aspects of such declarations or judgments in specific cases can be very
significant. If both peace and war are conditions in which activities are
circumscribed under law, one aspect of the difference between them is
certainly to be found in their definition as respective legal norms. This
involves the delineation of a certain set of conditions in which a special
type of conduct, a state of war, is authorized; beyond that, however, is a
delineation of certain other conditions in which this same type of conduct
is not authorized, a condition of peace.
In this sense, the definition of war marks the break-point analytically
between the use of force punitively as police power, and its use defensively
to sustain the government against its enemies. Of course, it should be clear
that analytically, in keeping with these definitions, the transition from a
state of peace to a state of war is neither legal nor illegal; it becomes simply
a question of conditions, or fact.
Traditionally, victory in war and victory in peace have been closely
related. Certainly both are considered to be the goal in war, but it is clear
that peace does not flow directly from military defeat of the enemy and
cessation of hostilities. Victory, to the extent that it is decisive, marks the
end of war in the material sense; that is, the end of warfare waged against a
17WRIGHT, I I supra, note 8, at 864.
18FRITZ GROB, THE RELATIVITY OF WAR AND PEACE, with foreword by Roscoe Pound
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949), 189.
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determinate enemy. Peace, on the other hand, is a generalized condition or
order which is secured and justified. In this equation, it seems clear that
peace may result from successful defense; that is, from the successful
elimihation of a determinate threat.
However, in this case there is a presumption of an already on-going
social and political process. In the absence of such process there is nothing
in the actual violence of combat that would create it. This is not to say, of
course, that the marshalling and ordering of resources to carry on warfare
may not have contributed to internal solidarity, thus helping to generate the
conditions necessary for internal order, and subsequently for peace. Never-
theless, on the whole, it seems evident that peace does imply effective
defense against any determinate military challenge, either from within or
without, coupled with the capability to enforce specific rights, as necessary.
Fundamentally, the public order which characterizes peace is based
upon the organization of activities within the community for the common
good. The basis for organization is invariably authority, and authority itself
depends upon a recognition, among the members of a group, of a right
inhering in some person or persons to act for the other members. The
person or persons to whom this right attaches are authorities; they, have
authority. Of central importance is the recognition that authority is granted
to a person by others; it does not necessarily accrue to him as an act of will
or direction on his part. He exercises influence over others because of the
way in which they react to him. A leader of a group has authority because
its members attribute authority to him.
Within the community are to be found a multitude of functional groups
of all types, each with its own leaders with authority in their own special-
ized fields. The supreme authority for the community is the political au-
thority. Traditionally, this right has inhered in the political state as the
sovereign territorial group. The very complexity of relationships among
these multiple groups and their members generates the requirement for an
overall ordering authority-the political circle concerned for the common
good. This group justifies itself in the administration of justice, which is the
primary function of government.
Individuals within the community are circumscribed by the groups with
which they identify. Individual personality is a reflection of these relation-
ships, which in turn are the product of social structuring in the community.
As a result, power and influence within the community are the product of
multiple and complex individual and group relationships. Power, as that
form of influence having to do with compulsory obedience, becomes dis-
tinctive of political authority, and successful monopoly over the structuring
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of power in the community, provides for domination within a territory. In
this process, however, political authority does not create or constitute the
social order; rather it realizes itself in structuring the political order which
is its formal manifestation.
Justice as elaborated in the political order is in the long run closely akin
to the basic structuring of values in the social order. It is generally agreed
that the basis for order in the community is some sense of what ought to
be. Without some awareness or sense of the norm, the idea of order loses
all content, and it is in the fundamental relationships of the social process
that the basis of the political order is to be found. It is in this way that the
ends of justice are served. Above all, justice rests upon the absence of
arbitrary action; in that sense it is closely akin to order, and thus to law
itself. In sum, human life and values are inconceivable without a pattern of
custom and law, elaborated in the social and political order.
In the concepts of law are to be found, related to concrete reality, the
universal principles that characterize a culture. It is in the changing rela-
tionships of a culture, with their consequent impact upon these universal
principles, that one may find the well-springs of social revolution. In-
stitutionalized behavior within society constitutes an expression of natural
law and order. Thus, laws in their broadest sense provide the matrix of the
political order, which is the means to the ends of justice, and in so doing
laws establish the right of authority. At the same time, positive law, as a
concrete expression of political authority, is constituted as a formulation of
the political order.
As the positive expression of the political order, government is con-
cerned directly with the dynamics in the changing relationships of the one
to the many-with the individual and the group. In the social process, acts
are the actions of individuals and not collectivities but the significance of
the acts of individuals is to be found in individual-group relationships.
Government is a manifestation of both; as such, it has been typed histori-
cally in a spectrum, varying from an association of relatively independent
individuals, through a structured aggregation of orders, to an all-embracing
unity.
Beginning with Hobbes, views approximating the first began to replace
the concept of government as a structured hierarchy, characteristic of the
feudal period. Under the influence of Rousseau and his concept of the
general will, emphasis began to shift to the concept of government as an
all-embracing unity. The critical element for freedom however, is not in
reality in the forms of government per se (democratic, aristocratic or
monarchical), nor the basis of its representation (class, function or region),
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but in the degree and permanency to which the individual and the groups
with which he identifies are absorbed into the all-embracing state. At any
given period, justice in government is measured in law, as an idealized
order reflecting what ought to be the relationship between the one and the
many, and emphasis upon unity tends to increase with war or revolutionary
crisis.
Obedience is the fundamental response of the individual to law. It
involves a notion of duty and a predisposition to action. It may be either a
limitation upon choices open to the individual, or it may be a commitment
to act under certain conditions in a given way. It may involve coercion, or
it may imply a free and dynamic response in keeping with the values of
society. In any case, the notions of morale and discipline are clearly
involved. Basically, it becomes a question of normative behavior, and
justification is an important aspect of this pattern of response.
The importance of justification in human affairs has been recognized
almost universally, independently of what may have been considered to be
the just or ideal relationship, in a specific instance, between government
and community. The notion of duty for the individual is complemented by
the notion of function for the government. The fundamental question is the
degree to which the resources and energies of the individual are absorbed
in the processes of government.
When the scope of governmental function is great, law includes a large
body of executive or administrative pronouncements, issued by the politi-
cal authority and applied to concrete situations. When the scope of govern-
mental function is small, all law may be of a general legislative type. It
seems fairly clear that administrative law plays a greater role when govern-
ment is engaged directly in the conduct of operations or providing services,
or when the head of state is a charismatic leader. In the processes of
government, however, both political authority and administrative law de-
pend in the long run for their legitimation upon legislative law.
On the whole, it seems relatively clear that government is concerned
with two major tasks. The first is the maintenance of the established legal
order, and the second is adjustment of it to emerging conditions. Both are
essential to justice and the continuance of the political order. If order is to
have any meaning, the mandates of the law must be sustained and enforced
at any given time; yet in the growing differentiation of function brought
about in an increasingly complex society, the political order is obliged to
keep pace with resultant changes in the social order, and this is a contin-
uing, and basically a revolutionary, task. The rationalization of society
must ultimately include a rationalization of the political structure. And this
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process involves adjustments not only in the internal but also in external
relationships, if order and security are to be preserved.
All government is faced with the requirement, sooner or later, of enforc-
ing and defending the public order. To do this, it finds itself obliged to
exercise its authority to regulate the use of force. Legitimation of the use of
force means in essence the formalization of the preconditions upon which
its use is contingent. This concept points to an essential aspect of public
order and security, that the use of force be conditioned upon authority
even when its purpose is to support authority itself. In the process of
government, the judicial function provides an essential check upon the
punitive use of force to execute the law. Likewise, war as a legal state, and
the organization of armed force under control of the state, are measures
designed to regularize the use of force in defending the peace.
V
It is often said, and many agree, that peace will be achieved when all
men obey a common law. The notion of world law is an appealing one. But
when this idea is voiced, it usually implies in practical fact some concept of
natural law, or perhaps customary law, such as the Roman and Scholastic
concept of jus gentium. The importance of such a concept, beyond its
practical value as an aggregation of procedures and practices followed by
nations in their dealings with each other, rests upon its value as a basis for
common authority.
The problem, simply put, is that natural law is in itself not sufficiently
explicit to regulate the complex procedural affairs of men, until it has been
translated by political authority into some form of legislative or adminis-
trative law. It is in this sense that authority, as the source of positive law,
provides the basis for both organization and justice in concrete instances.
On the other hand, it seems clear that there is a significant relationship
between the notion of natural law and political authority. The concept of
such a link becomes very important in any consideration of political struc-
turing and organization. Max Weber's three pure types of legitimate au-
thority are well known and widely accepted, at least insofar as they provide
a foundation for further analysis. 19 As is always the case when dealing with
a typology, it is useful to remind ourselves that concrete instances general-
ly include elements of all types, in this case-rational, traditional and
'
9
MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, trans. by A.
M. Henderson and Talecott Parsons; ed. and with intr. by Talecott Parsons (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1947), 328, etpassim.
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charismatic. If one allows that aspects of all are present to some degree in
each unique instance, the fundamental question remains: what part does
the basic notion of law itself play in the idea of authority?
Perhaps no single answer is entirely satisfactory. Nevertheless, it is
difficult to avoid the thought that some degree of predictability, or perhaps
historicity, is inherent in the overall concept of legitimate authority. The
full implication of such a concept depends, of course, upon one's own view
of the historical process.
The idea of rational grounds as the basis for legitimate authority is
especially appealing, in view of the increasing rationality of modern
society. Weber, of course, explains the second through the social action of
the first. To connect these two, one has to remember that Weber (he did
not attempt any simplistic explanation of the social process on the grounds
that man is rational) visualized that legitimate authority based upon rational
grounds achieves its ends through organizing domination of the commu-
nity.20
In this sense, rationality becomes a revolutionary force in society; and it
provides in part Weber's answer to Marx. A further point should be noted
about Weber's typology of authority: In the traditional and charismatic,
obedience is to the specific person; in the rational, it is to the role. It is in
the rationalized concept of the role that authority attaches to the person
occupying it at any given time. Thus individual man and generalized law
are related in a rationalized, if nevertheless depersonalized, society.
The revolutionary impact of the rationalization of society is apparent
throughout the world at the present time. The growth of modern tech-
nology is its most obvious expression. The pressures for industrialization
are increasingly evident in the political reorientation of under-developed
areas throughout the world. Under the stimulus of modern commu-
nications, goods, services and information are flowing into remote areas,
undermining traditional values and the traditional bases of authority. The
polit* al results are evident in the realignments within the world commu-
nity. Although rationalization and industrialization provide increased eco-
nomic benefits, it is not clear that these include in themselves as process,
ultimately, the seeds of some universal religion, or other transcen-
dental-value system as a basis for unifying authority. In fact, increasing
alienation in modern society suggests that the opposite may be true.
20Max Weber, Politics As A Vocation, From MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY, trans.,
ed. and with intr. by H. H. Berth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press,
1948), 78-83.
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Furthermore, the nature of modern technology is such that even con-
ventional weapons systems are becoming increasingly destructive, while
the integrative effect of tactical organizations and operations is becoming
correspondingly smaller. As a result, these weapons systems provide less
and less for the integration and structuring of the political community
under authority. Expanding markets in themselves provide pressures for
economic integration; but post-war experience suggests that this is not
necessarily relevant for political consolidation. On balance, it is not clear
that the integrative pressures in the rationalization of society offset the
disruptive ones.
With greater emphasis upon common law and the universal community
of man, the importance of morality and ethics as a political factor is
increasing. Improved communication coupled with the expanding services
of UNESCO and other UN agencies has increased world-wide
people-to-people contacts. This in turn broadens the basis for international
cooperation, but its impact, in the long run, upon internal and external
solidarity among states is unknown. Increasing acceptance of the notion of
just war places greater emphasis upon individual evaluation of the justice
of specific wars.
Historically, the stoics and early Christians concluded that war was
contrary to human nature, paving the way for non-resistant pacifism. Led
by Saint Augustine, early Christian theologians qualified this position,
leading to the later Scholastic concepts of just war, fought to promote
peace and restore order and justice. But these just-war concepts did not
prevent political fragmentation, nor did they provide for political consoli-
dation. On the whole, it is simply not evident that stress upon world law
and morality, independent of political authority, will lead to increased
political integration in the world community.
Because of the nature of modern nuclear weapons systems, their useful-
ness in international political integration seems limited, to the degree that
overall strategic stability can be maintained. Consequently, the authority of
the United Nations will presumably remain limited and dependent upon the
individual and collective action of the member states. Some limited region-
al political solidification could conceivably come about within the frame-
work of the UN, through political manipulation backed by limited author-
itative responses by individual states or power blocks.
In any case, however, it can be expected that law and force to sustain
internally structured political authority will continue to be essential to the
avoidance of social and political fragmentation, and to the maintenance of
international stability and law.
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